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Udry (1996) uses household survey data and finds that the allocation of resources 
within households is Pareto inefficient, contradicting the main assumption of most 
collective models of intrahousehold bargaining. He finds that among plots planted 
with the same crop in the same year, within a given household, those controlled by 
women produce lower yields than the men’s plots. This paper challenges that finding. 
Using an alternative nationally representative dataset, I find that only households in 
regions geographically proximate to those studied by Udry exhibit Pareto inefficient 
intrahousehold allocations, while the rest of the country reveals no evidence of Pareto 
inefficiencies. Households in regions experiencing negative rainfall shocks are on 
average less likely to exhibit Pareto inefficient intrahousehold allocations, and these 
negative rainfall shocks are correlated with increases in labor resources allocated to 
the wife’s plots, further confirming that in bad years, households try to avoid 
losses from Pareto inefficiency. 
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1 Introduction
Extensive evidence against the unitary model of household decision making, which treats the
members of a family as if they behave as a single individual, has led economists to consider
more general models that emphasize the role of individual actors and allow for intrahousehold
bargaining among family members.1 The most general collective model of the household
(Chiappori, 1988; Browning and Chiappori, 1998) argues that, although individuals may
bargain over the allocation of household resources, the outcome is assumed to be Pareto
e¢ cient. Using data from France (Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori, and Lechène, 1993),
Canada (Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechène, 1994), Taiwan (Thomas and
Chen, 1994), Indonesia (Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg, 2002), Bangladesh, Ethiopia,
South Africa (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003), and Ghana (Rangel, 2004), researchers
empirically reject the unitary model, but the results remain consistent with Pareto e¢ ciency.
However, an inuential paper by Udry (1996) using plot-level agricultural data from
households in Burkina Faso nds that the allocation of resources within these African house-
holds is Pareto ine¢ cient.2 Udry estimates household-year-crop xed e¤ects regressions and
nds that within a given household, among plots planted with the same crop in the same
1Seminal theoretical papers by Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), and Lundberg and
Pollak (1993) develop cooperative bargaining models. Inuential empirical papers by Schultz (1990), Thomas
(1990), and Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) reject the unitary model. For a more recent review of the
intrahousehold bargaining literature see Strauss and Thomas (1995), Behrman (1997), Haddad, Hoddinott,
and Alderman (1997), and Strauss, Mwabu, and Beegle (2000).
2Anthropologists have also argued that in the African context, there is a broad division between the
economic spheres of men and women and that husbands and wives separately control their productive
resources, have di¤erent constraints on their choices, have di¤erent responsibilities to satisfy with their
personal incomes, and have di¤erent prospects for risk diversication (Hill, 1975; Guyer, 1986). Previous
research by an economist using data from Cameroon (Jones, 1986) showed that husbands and wives were not
being e¢ cient in terms of production decisions. A more recent paper using data from Côte dIvoire (Duo
and Udry, 2004) also nds evidence of Pareto ine¢ ciencies in intrahousehold allocations. All of the evidence
of Pareto ine¢ cient intrahousehold allocations is based on African surveys with the exception of Djebbari
(2005) who nds similar results using Mexican PROGRESA data.
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year, those plots controlled by women produce lower yields than the mens plots. This evi-
dence implies that productive resources (labor, land, or fertilizer) reallocated from husband
to wife within a household would yield a larger output for both members of the family.
This paper extends Udrys analysis by examining why households might choose to be-
have in a Pareto ine¢ cient manner and further testing the robustness of his original results.
The data Udry uses were collected by the International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) and are from 150 households in six villages in three Burk-
ina Faso provinces. I compare the ICRISAT data with a di¤erent nationally representative
household survey that was collected by the World Banks Technical Department for Africa
in conjunction with the Burkina Faso National Directorate for Studies and Planning (DEP
is the French acronym used throughout the paper). This nationally representative survey
interviewed 2406 households in 401 villages in all thirty Burkina Faso provinces. Results
examining intrahousehold Pareto ine¢ ciency using the DEP data vary depending on which
provinces are used for the xed e¤ects regressions. Using the DEP data, when the regressions
include only those provinces located geographically close to the three ICRISAT provinces,
there is a signicant, negative e¤ect on yields for women, conrming Udrys ndings. How-
ever, when the xed e¤ects regressions are estimated using the other Burkina Faso provinces
(those not located near the three ICRISAT provinces), the results indicate no evidence of
Pareto ine¢ cient intrahousehold allocations. This within country heterogeneity, in terms of
which regions exhibit Pareto ine¢ ciencies, highlights the fact that generalizing conclusions
based on data from only six villages should be made with caution.
I then examine why certain regions exhibit Pareto ine¢ ciencies in a given year. Udry
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argues that the Pareto ine¢ cient results are due to women having less access to household
fertilizer and labor resources (male, child, and non-household labor). While it is feasible
there could be a Pareto e¢ cient allocation of husband and wife resources that yields a larger
output for both individuals, in practice there might be costs involved in achieving this im-
provement. These costs might include monitoring labor inputs over geographically dispersed
plots, transaction costs and asymmetric information involved in trading labor and resources
between household members, and social norms that discourage such exchanges. If these costs
are greater than the loss due to the Pareto ine¢ ciency, husbands and wives will not change
their behavior. However, in periods when there are negative rainfall shocks, households
might have larger incentives to overcome these transaction and monitoring costs or ignore
the social norms because the consequences of ine¢ ciency are greater. I present evidence
that households in regions experiencing negative rainfall shocks are on average less likely to
exhibit Pareto ine¢ ciencies, while households in regions experiencing better than average
rainfall are more likely to observe social norms and exhibit Pareto ine¢ cient intrahousehold
behavior. Additional evidence shows that negative rainfall shocks are correlated with in-
creases in labor resources allocated to the wifes plots in the household, further conrming
that, in bad years, households try to avoid the losses due to Pareto ine¢ ciency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the ICRISAT
and DEP data and the empirical setting in Burkina Faso. Section 3 describes the empiri-
cal identication strategy Udry uses and the relevant test of Pareto e¢ ciency, followed by
an extension of that test to examine the role of rainfall shocks in intrahousehold resource
allocation. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data and Empirical Setting
Farm production in Burkina Faso is primarily at the subsistence level and is based on rain-fed
agriculture in which each household cultivates multiple plots growing di¤erent crops (for a
more detailed description of the farming system refer to Udry (1996) or Matlon (1988)). As
Udry also explains in detail (and is described by anthropologists who work in sub-Saharan
Africa (Guyer, 1986; Berry, 1993; Saul, 1993)), an individual within a household has substan-
tial control over which crops are planted on his or her plot, the timing of sowing, weeding,
and harvesting, the quantity of inputs used on the plot, and the rights to the output from
that plot. This individual control over inputs and outputs often leads husbands and wives
to plant the same crop in the same year on di¤erent plots.
2.1 ICRISAT Data
There are several di¤erences between the ICRISAT and DEP datasets which may confound
comparisons. ICRISAT collected the data between 1981 and 1985 in three provinces of
Burkina Faso (Udry only uses the 1981 to 1983 data because those are the years that contain
detailed plot-level agricultural information). The survey period comprises both good and
poor harvests, with 1984 and 1985 being particularly bad drought years (Reardon, Delgado,
and Matlon, 1992; Reardon, Kelly, Crawford, Jayne, Savadogo, Clay, 1996).
In 1980, prior to the survey, ICRISAT conducted qualitative interviews with small groups
of farmers in 30 villages in western Burkina Faso (between Dori and Bobo-Dioulasso) to de-
termine which provinces and villages should be selected. ICRISAT combined the data from
these qualitative interviews with secondary data to select provinces that met their program
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objectives, and the three provinces were chosen to be representative of the di¤erent agroe-
cological zones of Burkina Faso (Matlon, 1988).3 Within each province, ICRISAT used a
number of criteria to select one village situated on a main road and one more remotely located
village. Villages had to be cooperative during the initial 1980 qualitative survey, accessible
year-round, not have unusual soils or crops, not have been involved in a major development
project, have the modal soil type for villages in that study zone, and have the modal village
population for that study zone. In addition, ICRISAT tried to select at least one village
in each province which satised all of the above criteria and also had a signicant fraction
of farmers using animal traction (Matlon, 1988). Within each selected village, households
were stratied based on animal traction use and then randomly selected. Approximately
every ten days, survey enumerators living in the six villages collected information on farm
operations, inputs, and outputs on each of the householdsplots. Summary statistics for the
variables in this dataset can be found in Udry (1996), Table 1.
2.2 DEP Data
DEP collected the data during the 1990-1991 crop season in order to examine the implemen-
tation of a training and visit-based agricultural extension program. DEP selected a random,
nationally representative sample of 2,406 households from all 30 provinces of Burkina Faso,
3The northern province, Soum, represents the agroclimatic zone of the Sahel. This region is characterized
by low rainfall and sandy soils. Because of the lands low productivity potential and because large parts of
the Sahel are suitable only for livestock grazing, there are signicant population pressures on the remaining
arable land. The central province, Passore, represents the Sudan-Savanna climatic zone. Rainfall is higher
than in the Sahel but still low. Soils have a low natural fertility, but production yields tend to be higher than
in the Sahel. This region is also more densely populated than the northern province. The southern province,
Mouhan, represents the northern Guinea-Savanna climatic zone. It has relatively high annual rainfall, good
agricultural potential with soils of intermediate depth and fertility, and low population pressures.
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covering di¤erent agroclimatic zones. The sampling of households was carried out in two
steps. First, villages were randomly selected from each province with the probability of selec-
tion proportional to the size of the village. Second, in each of the 401 villages, six households
were randomly chosen and interviewed (Bindlish, Evenson, and Gbetibouo, 1993). To min-
imize potential bias, the Burkina Faso extension agency involved in providing training and
visit-based extension did not participate in the sample or questionnaire design phases and
did not collect the data (Bindlish, Evenson, and Gbetibouo, 1993). Summarizing the di¤er-
ences between the datasets, the DEP data are nationally representative and have a larger
sample of interviewed households, but there is less detailed information about production
inputs and less plot-level information about soil quality and plot topography that is one of
the strengths of the ICRISAT data.
There are also signicant di¤erences in the DEP data between those provinces located
proximate to the ICRISAT provinces (I will label these provinces near-ICRISAT) and those
provinces in the rest of the country.4 The near-ICRISAT provinces contain households with
larger average plot sizes, greater wealth, and a higher percentage of households in areas with
rainfall above the long-run province average. Panel A of Table 1 shows that average plot
size is 0.71 hectares in the near-ICRISAT region but only 0.64 hectares in the rest of the
country, a di¤erence that is signicant at the 1 percent level. Total household land holdings,
a measure of wealth, are signicantly higher in the near-ICRISAT region (6.00 versus 5.11
hectares) and the result is signicant at the 1 percent level. Using the ICRISAT data, total
4The near-ICRISAT provinces include the three provinces surveyed by ICRISAT (Soum, Passore, and
Mouhoun) as well as Bam and Oudalan in the northern zone, Kadiogo, Kossi, Oubritenga, and Sourou in
the central zone, and Bougouriba and Komoe in the southern zone.
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landholdings are 6.39 hectares. In addition, with the DEP data in the near-ICRISAT region,
24.97 percent of plots experienced rainfall above the long-run average for that province but
only 7.11 percent of plots in the rest of the country experienced a positive rainfall shock.
This di¤erence is signicant at the 1 percent level. With the ICRISAT data, 54.99 percent
of plots experienced a positive rainfall shock.
There are also important di¤erences in the type of crops that are grown in the near-
ICRISAT region compared with the rest of Burkina Faso. Panel B of Table 1 shows that this
region has a higher percentage of plots planted with cash crops (cotton) or crops that require
large inputs of fertilizer (maize) or labor (rice, fonio, and earthpeas) and subsequently fewer
plots planted with millet, sorghum or groundnuts. These di¤erences are all signicant at
the 1 percent level (with the exception of millet which shows no di¤erence between regions).
The ICRISAT data show a similar pattern to the near-ICRISAT region in the DEP data,
with an even larger percentage of plots planted to cotton and rice and fewer plots planted
to millet, sorghum, or groundnuts.
3 Household Model and Empirical Strategy
Udry (1996) develops a theoretical model of household behavior to derive a test for Pareto
e¢ ciency in the allocation of productive resources within the household. He argues that if
the household allocates the factors of production e¢ ciently, then within a given household,
in the same year, plots planted to the same crop should have similar yields regardless of
whether the plot is controlled by the husband or wife. He estimates the following household-
year-crop xed e¤ects regression to test whether the gender of the individual who controls
7
the plot inuences plot yields:
Qhtci = Xhtci + Ghtci + htc + "htci (1)
where Qhtci is the yield on plot i planted with crop c at time t by a member of household
h, Xhtci is a vector of characteristics for the plot (which includes the plot area), Ghtci is the
gender of the individual who controls the plot, htc is a household-year-crop xed e¤ect, and
"htci is an error term that captures any unobserved plot quality variation and plot-specic
production shocks on yields. Based on Udrys model, the exclusion restriction that the
gender of the individual controlling the plot should not have any impact on plot output,
yields a test of whether  = 0.
To examine how rainfall shocks inuence the intrahousehold allocation of resources, I
modify the household-year-crop xed e¤ects regressions to include an interaction of rainfall
shocks with the gender of who controls the plot, as follows:
Qhtci = Xhtci + 1Ghtci + 2(Ghtci Rain Shockht) + htc +  htci (2)
where Qhtci, Xhtci, Ghtci, and htc are as previously dened, Rain Shockht is an indicator
for whether household h experiences rainfall at time t above the long-run average for the
province, and  htci is a random, idiosyncratic error term.
5 In the empirical section, I employ
several alternative measures of rainfall shocks including looking at extreme variations in
rainfall (in which rainfall is more than 0.5 standard deviations above or below the long-run
5In Equation 2, I do not include the Rain Shockht main e¤ect because it will be absorbed by the xed
e¤ects.
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province average of rainfall) because these extremes are both more observable to household
members and might have larger costs associated with them.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Baseline Household-Year-Crop Fixed E¤ects Regressions
In Table 2a, I estimate the household-year-crop xed e¤ects regression from Equation 1
to examine the impact on yields due to the gender of the person who controls the plot.
In Column 1, I use the ICRISAT data to replicate the results from Udry (1996) Table 7,
Column 2. I nd that within a household if a women manages a plot, yields are 28.5 percent
lower than if a man manages a plot planted with the same crop in the same year. The
gender results hold even after controlling for observable characteristics of the plot, such
as plot size.6 The results show a strong pattern in which smaller plots are farmed more
intensively and have higher yields than larger plot sizes. In the ICRISAT data, there are
additional observable plot characteristics, such as soil type, topography, and distance from
the compound, and Udry shows that the gender results are unchanged even after including
those variables (Table 7, column 3). Since the DEP data do not contain these additional
characteristics, I restrict the ICRISAT regressions to only control for plot size.
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 2a, I estimate the xed e¤ects regressions using the DEP data
restricted to the near-ICRISAT provinces (column 2) and all other provinces in Burkina Faso
(column 3).7 When the data are restricted to the near-ICRISAT provinces, there is a large
6Following Udry (1996), for the ICRISAT data, I omit the 5th decile of plot size and with the DEP data,
I omit the plot size category Size 4.
7Since the DEP data are only from one agricultural season, I cannot include year xed e¤ects, so the
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negative impact of gender on plot yields with women having 50.0 percent lower yields than
men in the same household planting the same crop, and the gender results are signicant at
the 5 percent level. However, in the other provinces of Burkina Faso, there is not a negative
relationship between the gender of the plot manager and yields. In fact, having a female plot
manager leads to 32.5 percent higher yields for plots planted with the same crop in the same
household and this result is signicant at the 10 percent level. The DEP data show similar
results regarding plot size, with smaller plots having larger yields, although the coe¢ cients
for the larger plot size variables are imprecisely measured.8
In Table 2b, I estimate the same household-year-crop xed e¤ects regressions as above,
but I restrict the data to only include plots planted with millet or sorghum. Results in
column 1 using the ICRISAT data show there is still a negative impact of gender on plot
yields with women having 19.7 percent lower yields on plots planted with these staple crops
but the impact is reduced compared with the regression using all crops. Using the DEP
data restricted to the near-ICRISAT region shows women have 41.1 percent lower yields
compared to men in the same household planting staple crops and the result is signicant at
the 10 percent level. This impact is also reduced compared to the regression using all crops
that showed a 50.0 percent reduction in yields for women. In the other provinces of Burkina
estimated regressions are household-crop xed e¤ects regressions.
8In the DEP data, plot size is coded in 0.1 hectare increments and 27.1 percent of all plots are coded as
0.1 hectares. Due to this, I code the rst three deciles of plot size into one plot size variable called Size 1.
The other plot size variables (Size 2 to Size 8) roughly correspond to the fourth to tenth deciles as shown in
the table, although there is some rounding due to plot size not being continuous. Size 2 is for plots that are
0.2 hectares and contains 15.6 percent of all plots. Size 3 is for 0.3 hectare plots and contains 10.0 percent
of all plots. Size 4 is for plots that are 0.4 and 0.5 hectares and contains 12.8 percent of plots while Size 5 is
for plots 0.6 and 0.7 hectares and represents 8.0 percent of all plots. Size 6 is for plots between 0.8 and 1.1
hectares inclusive and represents 9.7 percent of all plots. Size 7 is for plots between 1.2 and 2.1 hectares and
contains 10.7 percent of all plots, while Size 8 is for plots larger than 2.2 hectares and contains 6.1 percent
of all plots. Results are robust to alternative plot size category codings.
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Faso, similar to the xed e¤ects regression with all crops, gender has a positive impact on
plot yields with women having 45.1 percent higher yields than men from the same household
planting staple crops.9 The results indicate that Udrys nding of Pareto ine¢ ciency within
the household can be replicated using the DEP data, but only when the data are restricted
to the same geographical location as the ICRISAT provinces. Extending the analysis to the
rest of Burkina Faso shows that the Pareto ine¢ cient results are not robust.
4.2 Impact of Rainfall Shocks
Having analyzed the regional heterogeneity of which households exhibit Pareto ine¢ cient
outcomes, I explore possible explanations for this variation and nd that in regions experi-
encing negative rainfall shocks the amount of Pareto ine¢ ciency is reduced. In Table 3, I
present household-year-crop xed e¤ects regressions that estimate Equation 2 and include
two alternative measures of rainfall shocks interacted with the gender of the plot manager
to determine if Pareto ine¢ cient outcomes are correlated with rainfall shocks. The rst
measure is a dummy variable taking the value one if the household is located in a province
that experienced rainfall greater than the long-run province average.10 The second measure
9The ICRISAT data contain price information in the six surveyed villages so I can calculate the value of
plot output per hectare for each crop harvested and use this as the dependent variable in the regressions.
However, the DEP data do not contain localized price information and so the regressions are estimated using
plot output per hectare as the dependent variable. For the xed e¤ects regressions focusing on a specic
crop, including price information would not change the results. For the regressions combining all crops,
I re-estimated the regressions using Burkina Faso Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources data on
national crop prices for 1991 and the results do not change (see International Monetary Fund (1998) for data
on the principal crop producer prices).
10For the ICRISAT data, the long-run province average is calculated using the 1981 to 1983 province
level rainfall measured in the six ICRISAT villages. With this data, 54.99 percent of household plots are
in regions that experienced rainfall greater than the long-run province average. For the DEP data, the
long-run province average is calculated using the Burkina Faso National Meteorological Service (Direction
de la Meteorologie Nationale) annual 1977 to 1990 rainfall amounts from weather stations in each province.
With the DEP data, only 13.75 percent of household plots are in regions that experienced rainfall greater
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tries to capture extreme positive and negative rainfall variations and examines provinces
that either had rainfall more than one-half standard deviation below the long-run province
average or more than one-half standard deviation above the long-run province average.11
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 provide robustness checks to test if the results vary with cut-o¤
levels other than one-half standard deviation above or below the long-run province average.
In column 1 of Table 3, using the ICRISAT data, I nd that if households experienced
a positive rainfall shock, womens yields, on plots planted with the same crop in the same
year within the same household, are 24.3 percent lower than mens yields. The result is
signicant at the 1 percent level. The net impact of gender on yields in areas with positive
rainfall shocks is 39.9 percent lower yields for women, compared with only 15.6 percent lower
yields in areas that experienced negative rainfall shocks. Column 2 presents results using
the second shock measure which incorporates extreme variations in rainfall. Individual and
household behavior might be more responsive to large rainfall variations that are more easily
observed. Compared to regions that had average rainfall, if a household experiences rainfall
greater than one-half standard deviation above the long-run province average, women had
31.7 percent lower yields than men and the coe¢ cient is signicant at the 10 percent level.
In those regions that experienced negative rainfall shocks (rainfall greater than one-half
standard deviation below the long-run province average), womens yields were 3.2 percent
higher but the coe¢ cient is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
than the long-run province average.
11For the ICRISAT data, the extreme rainfall measure shows that 28.70 percent of household plots had
rainfall more than one-half standard deviation below the long-run province average, and 27.67 percent of
household plots had rainfall more than one-half standard deviation above the long-run province average.
For the DEP data, this measure shows that 58.11 percent of household plots had rainfall levels more than
one-half standard deviation below the long-run province average, while only 6.68 percent of household plots
had rainfall more than one-half standard deviation above the long-run province average.
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Using the DEP data, in column 3, in areas with a positive rainfall shock, womens yields
are 34.6 percent lower than mens yields although the coe¢ cient is not precisely measured.
The net impact of gender on yields in those areas with negative rainfall shocks is positive but
not signicantly di¤erent from zero. However, using the measure of extreme rainfall shocks
shows that womens yields are 208.6 percent lower than mens in areas that experience a large
positive rainfall shock and the coe¢ cient is signicant at the 10 percent level. In addition,
in areas experiencing negative rainfall shocks, the net impact of gender on crop yields is only
3.6 percent lower yields for women, which is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Overall,
these results indicate that in areas experiencing negative rainfall shocks in which the cost of
being ine¢ cient is larger, the impact of gender on yields is greatly reduced. This contrasts
with positive rainfall shock areas in which households are more likely to be Pareto ine¢ cient
and womens yields are signicantly lower than mens yields for the same crop planted in
the same household in the same year.
To test the robustness of these results, I use di¤erent cut-o¤ levels in measuring rainfall
shocks (alternative standard deviations above or below long-run average rainfall) to see if
the observed link between Pareto ine¢ ciency and shocks varies. Appendix Table 1 presents
results using ICRISAT data and in columns 1 and 2, I dene alternative specications of
rainfall shocks as, respectively, more than 1.5 or 1 standard deviation below the long-run
province average.12 The results are unchanged from Table 3. Column 3 presents regressions
12Rainfall shock specications focusing on rainfall levels greater than one standard deviation above the
long-run province average are not possible with the DEP data because the largest positive rainfall shock
is 0.61 standard deviations above the long-run province average. However, in the ICRISAT data, there
are households experiencing rainfall shocks as high as 1.39 standard deviations above the long-run province
average. Regression results with the ICRISAT data are similar using a rainfall shock measure looking at
rainfall shocks one standard deviation below or above the long-run province average.
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using a rainfall shock measure that captures ner gradations of rainfall variation, including
large negative rainfall shocks (rainfall greater than one-half standard deviation below the
long-run province average), moderate negative rainfall shocks (rainfall less than one-half
standard deviation below the long-run province average), moderate positive rainfall shocks
(rainfall less than one-half standard deviation above the long-run province average), and
large positive rainfall shocks (rainfall greater than one-half standard deviation above the
long-run province average). The results are qualitatively similar with women experiencing
a large negative impact in regions with large positive rainfall shocks, although only the
coe¢ cient for the largest positive rainfall shock is precisely measured. Finally, in column 4, I
interact the plot managers gender with total rainfall in that province and nd that for each
additional millimeter of rainfall, plot yields decrease by an insignicant 0.065 percent. This
indicates that the impact of rainfall and gender on yields is not a linear function of rainfall
amounts, but rather depends on extreme variations above or below the province long-run
average. Appendix Table 2 presents similar robustness checks with alternative rainfall shock
specications using the DEP data, and the results are consistent with those in Table 3.
4.3 Impact of Rainfall Shocks By Crop
To further examine the link between rainfall shocks and Pareto ine¢ ciency, in Table 4, I
estimate household-year-crop xed e¤ects regressions comparing the staple crops, millet and
sorghum, with the cash and labor intensive crops, cotton, rice, and fonio. The results indicate
that rainfall shocks and gender have a signicantly di¤erent impact on yields for the two
types of crops. With the ICRISAT data, in areas experiencing rainfall above the long-run
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province average, womens yields are 15.1 percent lower than mens yields for staple crops
but are 143.6 percent lower for cotton, rice, and fonio. The same pattern is seen in the DEP
data for areas with positive rainfall shocks. Womens yields on staple crops are 16.7 percent
higher than mens yields (although the coe¢ cient is not signicantly di¤erent from zero),
but for cotton, rice, and fonio, womens yields are 634.8 percent lower than mens yields.
Appendix Table 3 presents results for the xed e¤ects regressions broken down by crop
using the alternative rainfall shock specication (large positive and negative rainfall shocks).
Results are consistent with Table 4, but some of the coe¢ cients are no longer statistically
signicant when using this alternative rainfall shock. With the ICRISAT data, in areas
experiencing large positive rainfall shocks, womens yields on cotton, rice, and fonio are 233
percent lower than mens yields, while for staple crops, womens yields are only 7.9 percent
lower. With the DEP data, for households facing large positive rainfall shocks, the net
impact of gender on yields for staple crops is 133.1 percent lower for women than men, but
for the cash and labor intensive crops, yields are 321.2 percent lower for women.
4.4 Impact of Rainfall Shocks by Wealth Levels
In Table 5, I analyze the role wealth plays in the intrahousehold allocation of resources and
the link between wealth and rainfall shocks. Columns 1 and 4 present baseline specications
interacting a measure of household wealth (whether the household owns above or below the
median amount of land) with the plot managers gender.13 Household wealth does not explain
13Alternative measures of wealth, including livestock holdings, use of animal traction, or the number of
non-family members employed on the farm are used and results are robust. Results are also robust to using
mean landholdings instead of median levels.
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plot yields as evidenced by a statistically insignicant coe¢ cient on the variable for gender
interacted with a dummy for households with below the median amount of landholdings.
However, when the sample is split into rich and poor households (based on household
landholdings) and the plot managers gender is interacted with rainfall shocks, I nd a dif-
ferential impact of rainfall shocks depending on the households wealth. For rich households
(those with landholdings above the median level), the net impact of gender on yields is sig-
nicantly more negative in areas experiencing positive rainfall shocks. Using the ICRISAT
data, females in rich households with a positive rainfall shock have 75.6 percent lower yields
than men in those same households planting the same crop in the same year, but females in
rich households with a negative rainfall shock only have 27.7 percent lower yields than men.
However, females in poor households facing a positive rainfall shock have 22.0 percent lower
yields than men, while females in poor households with a negative rainfall shock only have
9.7 percent lower yields. The results using the DEP data are even more stark. Females in rich
households with positive rainfall shocks have 191.3 percent lower yields than men in those
same households, while females in rich households with negative rainfall shocks harvest only
7.2 percent less than men. For females in poor households experiencing a positive rainfall
shock, yields are 130.3 percent lower than mens yields, while females in poor households
facing a negative rainfall shock have 2.6 percent higher yields than men.
4.5 Impact of Rainfall Shocks On Productive Inputs
Having analyzed the impact of rainfall shocks on Pareto ine¢ cient outcomes within the
household, in Table 6, I use the ICRISAT data to estimate household-year-crop xed e¤ects
16
Tobit regressions to consider the mechanisms a household uses to adjust its behavior in
response to rainfall shocks, particularly focusing on adjustments to labor and fertilizer inputs
(male labor, female labor, child labor, non-family labor, and fertilizer).14 I estimate baseline
specications controlling for the plot managers gender, and results indicate plots managed
by women have 632 hours less male labor, 248 hours less child labor, 356 hours less non-
family labor, and 15,070 kilograms less manure. The male labor result is signicant at the 1
percent level and the child labor and fertilizer results are signicant at the 5 percent level,
but the non-family labor result is not signicant at standard levels. However, in households
that face negative rainfall shocks, plots managed by women garner an extra 135 hours of
male labor, an amount which signicantly di¤ers from zero at the 10 percent level. Women
in these households also receive an additional 115 hours of non-family labor, 27 hours of child
labor, and 6050 kilograms of manure, although the coe¢ cients are not statistically signicant
at standard levels. In addition, in households facing negative rainfall shocks, women work
239 fewer hours on their plots, presumably switching labor to other tasks that are more
productive such as home production or marketing.15
5 Conclusion
Given the signicant nding of Pareto ine¢ ciency in intrahousehold allocations in the paper
by Udry (1996), the results of this paper are surprising. Using the nationally representative
14I estimate the xed e¤ects Tobit regressions using Honorés (1992) xed e¤ects Tobit estimator. I
use the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno optimization method, but similar results are obtained using the
Polak-Ribiere Conjugate Gradient Method, the Simplex Method, or Powells Method.
15Unfortunately, the DEP data do not contain information about productive inputs, so I cannot replicate
this analysis using that data.
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Burkina Faso National Directorate for Studies and Planning (DEP) data, I nd that regions
which are geographically close to the ICRISAT provinces exhibit the same Pareto ine¢ cient
allocations that Udry found with the ICRISAT data. However, no evidence of ine¢ ciency is
found in the other provinces of Burkina Faso. Results indicate that this regional heterogene-
ity is correlated with rainfall shocks. Households in regions experiencing negative rainfall
shocks are less likely to have ine¢ cient intrahousehold allocations, possibly because the cost
of being ine¢ cient is greater in the face of a negative rainfall shock. Households facing a
negative rainfall shock are also more likely to allocate additional labor resources to the wifes
plots in the household, further verifying that, in bad years, they try to avoid the losses due
to being ine¢ cient.
These results portray a story of how households are e¢ ciently responding to changes in
relative productivity shocks. In areas that experience positive rainfall shocks, male labor and
resources are shifted to crops that men predominantly control (cotton, rice, and fonio) and
for which prices are determined at a national or international level. However, for women who
are growing predominantly staple crops for which the price is determined locally (millet and
sorghum), there are fewer benets of a positive rainfall shock, and it is likely these women
shift their time to other home production or trading activities. There is also evidence that
in bad rainfall years, husbands shift resources to growing staple crops to ensure household
consumption. Once the role of rainfall shocks is accounted for, it is no longer clear that
households are behaving in a Pareto ine¢ cient manner.
The results also indicate that Pareto e¢ ciency is not an exogenous outcome, but rather
that it might be caused by the households behavioral decisions and is therefore an en-
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dogenous decision. Understanding the implications of that decision merits additional future
research, both to measure whether similar patterns are found in other countries and to
measure the impact of the decision on labor supply, health, and human capital investment
outcomes. However, the data requirements to test the hypothesis that rainfall shocks are
correlated with the decision of a household to be e¢ cient or ine¢ cient are quite high. The
data must include plot-level information, including yields, and who managed the plot. In ad-
dition, there must be enough geographical variation in the data (several regions or an entire
country) to have di¤erential rainfall shocks across regions or there must be variation over
time. Few datasets satisfy these requirements suggesting that additional data collection may
be necessary to adequately test these hypotheses of whether or not households are behaving
e¢ ciently.
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics Comparing ICRISAT and DEP Data 
 
 ICRISAT Data  DEP Data 
   Near-
ICRISAT 
Provinces 
All Other 
Provinces in 
Burkina Faso 
Difference 
(3) – (2) 
 (1)  (2) (3)  
Panel A:      
Average Plot Size (hectares) 0.51  0.71 0.64 -0.07*** 
     [0.018] 
      
Wealth Measure:      
 Total HH land holdings (hectares) 6.39  6.00 5.11 -0.89*** 
     [0.083] 
      
Percentage of plots in which Rainfall 
> Long-run Province Average 
54.99  24.97 7.11 -17.86*** 
[0.63] 
      
Panel B:      
Percentage of plots planted to a given 
crop [column percent] 
     
      
 Millet 17.64 26.00 25.60 -0.40 
     [0.83] 
 Sorghum 29.52 28.56 35.77 7.21*** 
     [0.89] 
 Maize 13.02 15.78 11.93 -3.85*** 
     [0.64] 
 Rice 3.39 2.14 1.29 -0.85*** 
     [0.24] 
 Fonio/ Earthpeas 10.59 10.86 6.59 -4.27*** 
     [0.52] 
 Cotton 7.37 4.40 2.42 -1.98*** 
     [0.33] 
 Groundnut 8.85 12.26 16.39 4.13*** 
     [0.67] 
 Others 9.62    
      
Observations 4655  4430 7492  
 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
ICRISAT data are from 3 provinces in Burkina Faso.  DEP data are from all 30 provinces in Burkina Faso.  
Column 2 uses DEP data and is restricted to 11 provinces (including the 3 ICRISAT provinces) that are 
geographically proximate to the 3 ICRISAT provinces.  Column 3 uses DEP data restricted to the other 19 
provinces of Burkina Faso. 
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Table 2a: Household-Year-Crop Fixed Effects Regressions of the Determinants of Plot Yield  
(All Crops) 
 
  ICRISAT Data  DEP Data 
    Near-ICRISAT 
Provinces 
All Other Provinces 
in Burkina Faso 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
      
Female  -28.535***  -50.040** 32.459* 
  [6.575]  [21.933] [17.188] 
Plot Size:      
 1st decile/Size 1  133.305***  179.432*** 95.168*** 
  [41.122]  [40.048] [25.533] 
      
 2nd decile  69.612***    
  [20.356]    
      
 3rd decile  64.087***    
  [13.738]    
      
 4th decile/Size 2  34.178**  64.446 39.907 
  [13.563]  [39.409] [28.920] 
      
 6th decile/Size 3  -1.966  39.288 5.466 
  [8.914]  [44.735] [30.376] 
      
 7th decile/Size 5  -13.484  -32.765 -11.748 
  [9.602]  [43.749] [39.661] 
      
 8th decile/Size 6  -18.001**  -67.530 -2.616 
  [8.668]  [50.468] [37.207] 
      
 9th decile/Size 7  -26.894***  41.772 10.415 
  [8.520]  [45.555] [34.448] 
      
 10th decile/Size 8  -33.170***  17.148 75.570 
  [8.691]  [59.475] [52.963] 
      
Constant  78.441***  600.232*** 592.723*** 
  [8.225]  [28.544] [20.980] 
Observations  4655  4430 7492 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
ICRISAT data are from 3 provinces in Burkina Faso. DEP data are from all 30 provinces in Burkina Faso.  
Column 2 uses DEP data and is restricted to 11 provinces (including the 3 ICRISAT provinces) that are 
geographically proximate to the 3 ICRISAT provinces. Column 3 uses DEP data restricted to the other 19 
provinces of Burkina Faso. The dependent variable is value of plot output/hectare for the ICRISAT data and 
plot output/hectare for the DEP data. The omitted land size category is the 5th decile for the ICRISAT data 
and Size 4 for the DEP data. 
 25
Table 2b: Household-Year-Crop Fixed Effects Regressions of the Determinants of Plot Yield 
(Only Millet & Sorghum) 
 
  ICRISAT Data  DEP Data 
    Near-ICRISAT 
Provinces 
All Other Provinces 
in Burkina Faso 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
      
Female  -19.673***  -41.116* 45.091*** 
  [3.120]  [22.513] [15.753] 
Plot Size:      
 1st decile/Size 1  35.248  168.802*** 108.229*** 
  [38.380]  [38.327] [25.470] 
      
 2nd decile  37.028***    
  [11.928]    
      
 3rd decile  29.553***    
  [6.885]    
      
 4th decile/Size 2  18.473***  22.726 41.413 
  [5.508]  [38.479] [29.893] 
      
 6th decile/Size 3  -2.418  36.634 11.517 
  [4.415]  [40.282] [29.492] 
      
 7th decile/Size 5  -11.230**  -47.137 -35.445 
  [4.646]  [39.472] [30.848] 
      
 8th decile/Size 6  -23.029***  -18.571 12.670 
  [5.113]  [42.060] [31.800] 
      
 9th decile/Size 7  -27.532***  50.915 13.321 
  [4.600]  [43.240] [28.883] 
      
 10th decile/Size 8  -32.352***  43.882 29.904 
  [4.871]  [49.375] [44.238] 
      
Constant  56.596***  510.991*** 527.915*** 
  [3.973]  [27.239] [19.192] 
Observations  2195  2417 4598 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
ICRISAT data are from 3 provinces in Burkina Faso. DEP data are from all 30 provinces in Burkina Faso.  
Column 2 uses DEP data and is restricted to 11 provinces (including the 3 ICRISAT provinces) that are 
geographically proximate to the 3 ICRISAT provinces. Column 3 uses DEP data restricted to the other 19 
provinces of Burkina Faso. The dependent variable is value of plot output/hectare for the ICRISAT data and 
plot output/hectare for the DEP data. The omitted land size category is the 5th decile for the ICRISAT data 
and Size 4 for the DEP data. 
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Table 3: Household-Year-Crop Fixed Effects Regressions of the Determinants of Plot Yield Including 
the Impact of Rainfall Shocks 
 
 ICRISAT Data DEP Data  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Female -15.608*** -21.988*** 12.735 40.581 
 [5.380] [5.548] [13.274] [26.271] 
     
Female * (Rainfall > Long-run Province 
 Average) 
-24.340*** 
[9.130] 
 -34.578 
[73.201] 
 
     
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 BELOW Long-run Province Average) 
 3.164 
[7.015] 
 -44.160 
[30.146] 
     
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 ABOVE Long-run Province Average) 
 -31.726* 
[17.099] 
 -208.581* 
[107.098] 
     
Plot Size:     
 1st decile/Size 1 130.948*** 131.728*** 126.139*** 124.752***
 [41.096] [41.118] [21.851] [21.820] 
 2nd decile 67.400*** 68.533***   
 [20.577] [20.430]   
 3rd decile 62.896*** 62.571***   
 [13.792] [13.833]   
 4th decile/Size 2 33.544** 33.320** 48.810** 48.538** 
 [13.538] [13.503] [23.336] [23.279] 
 6th decile/Size 3 -2.369 -3.213 17.994 18.219 
 [8.906] [9.021] [25.187] [25.174] 
 7th decile/Size 5 -14.443 -14.709 -21.068 -21.717 
 [9.601] [9.714] [29.644] [29.579] 
 8th decile/Size 6 -19.058** -19.518** -26.538 -28.028 
 [8.708] [8.891] [30.062] [30.045] 
 9th decile/Size 7 -27.472*** -27.353*** 20.940 20.417 
 [8.552] [8.590] [27.585] [27.555] 
 10th decile/Size 8 -33.594*** -33.967*** 52.769 50.303 
 [8.722] [8.831] [39.721] [39.585] 
Constant 79.502*** 80.024*** 595.443*** 595.746***
 [8.345] [8.551] [16.983] [16.936] 
Observations 4655 4655 11922 11922 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The dependent variable is value of plot output/hectare for the ICRISAT data and plot output/hectare for the 
DEP data.  The omitted rainfall shock category in columns 2 and 4 is rainfall amounts less than 0.5 standard 
deviations above or below the province long-run average rainfall.  The omitted land size category is the 5th 
decile for the ICRISAT data and Size 4 for the DEP data. 
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Table 4: Household-Year-Crop Fixed Effects Regressions of the Determinants of Plot Yield Broken 
Down by Crop 
 
ICRISAT Data  DEP Data  
Millet-
Sorghum 
Cotton- 
Rice-Fonio 
Millet-
Sorghum 
Cotton-
Rice-Fonio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Female -11.396*** 27.585 20.409 38.734 
 [3.402] [23.671] [12.854] [101.398] 
     
Female * (Rainfall > Long-run Province 
 Average) 
-15.107*** 
[4.317] 
-143.639* 
[73.694] 
16.654 
[69.938] 
-634.788** 
[289.507] 
     
Plot Size:     
 1st decile/Size 1 37.423 230.296** 129.190*** 177.650 
 [37.851] [99.584] [21.280] [126.833] 
 2nd decile 35.991*** 120.972***   
 [11.754] [46.053]   
 3rd decile 29.056*** 128.493***   
 [6.836] [43.706]   
 4th decile/Size 2 17.820*** 64.943* 35.800 58.301 
 [5.503] [35.103] [23.791] [131.078] 
 6th decile/Size 3 -2.853 3.612 18.933 47.230 
 [4.369] [43.246] [24.054] [151.446] 
 7th decile/Size 5 -12.099*** 18.164 -39.478 76.595 
 [4.562] [30.960] [24.442] [207.624] 
 8th decile/Size 6 -23.656*** 6.989 3.943 -202.338 
 [5.069] [31.196] [25.443] [220.428] 
 9th decile/Size 7 -27.870*** -6.122 24.759 109.793 
 [4.576] [29.932] [24.123] [198.628] 
 10th decile/Size 8 -32.564*** -15.234 35.112 177.683 
 [4.867] [32.525] [33.789] [271.772] 
     
Constant 56.920*** 44.407 521.349*** 841.580*** 
 [3.963] [37.884] [15.791] [104.945] 
     
Observations 2195 994 7015 1543 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
The dependent variable is value of plot output/hectare for the ICRISAT data and plot output/hectare for the 
DEP data.  The omitted land size category is the 5th decile for the ICRISAT data and Size 4 for the DEP 
data. 
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Table 5: Household-Year-Crop Fixed Effects Regressions of the Determinants of Plot Yield 
Including the Impact of Rainfall Shocks and Wealth 
 
 ICRISAT Data  DEP Data  
 All 
Households 
Below 
Median 
Land 
Holdings 
Above 
Median 
Land 
Holdings 
All 
Households 
Below 
Median 
Land 
Holdings 
Above 
Median 
Land 
Holdings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Female -32.089*** -15.767** -27.813*** 15.532 9.673 57.991* 
 [9.340] [7.774] [7.926] [19.613] [39.830] [33.910] 
       
Female * Below Median 
Land Holdings 
7.875 
[8.916] 
  -12.714 
[27.375] 
  
       
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 
Standard Deviations 
BELOW Long-run 
Province Average) 
 6.045 
[11.343] 
0.139 
[8.767] 
 -7.102 
[46.330] 
-65.172* 
[39.050] 
       
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 
Standard Deviations 
ABOVE Long-run 
Province Average) 
 -6.230 
[11.356] 
-47.805* 
[27.791] 
 -139.959 
[206.223] 
-249.257** 
[120.194] 
       
Plot Size:       
 1st decile/Size 1 133.544*** 44.981 199.173*** 125.388*** 116.539*** 129.634*** 
 [41.176] [38.356] [59.060] [22.013] [30.862] [29.830] 
 2nd decile 69.614*** 73.050** 70.757***    
 [20.341] [33.077] [25.584]    
 3rd decile 63.610*** 47.151** 74.980***    
 [13.830] [18.293] [20.155]    
 4th decile/Size 2 34.049** 28.599 37.085** 48.222** 39.434 53.680* 
 [13.561] [22.000] [17.188] [23.440] [33.052] [31.187] 
 6th decile/Size 3 -1.885 -10.782 2.490 15.875 2.965 25.356 
 [8.910] [16.071] [10.729] [25.343] [36.142] [34.056] 
 7th decile/Size 5 -13.304 -7.757 -18.088 -21.541 -23.059 -21.608 
 [9.591] [13.324] [13.367] [29.839] [40.232] [40.588] 
 8th decile/Size 6 -17.873** -8.263 -26.829** -27.839 -16.397 -37.292 
 [8.647] [11.327] [12.747] [30.378] [42.591] [40.026] 
 9th decile/Size 7 -26.905*** -20.762** -32.227** 18.730 24.491 17.037 
 [8.531] [10.428] [12.649] [27.678] [38.683] [35.372] 
 10th decile/Size 8 -33.629*** -27.706** -39.760*** 46.730 17.941 47.598 
 [8.856] [10.809] [12.992] [39.845] [129.433] [41.623] 
Constant 78.430*** 81.802*** 83.438*** 595.990*** 574.161*** 618.762*** 
 [8.226] [10.990] [12.457] [16.991] [23.154] [23.040] 
Observations 4655 2325 2330 11816 5682 6134 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent 
variable is value of plot output/hectare for the ICRISAT data and plot output/hectare for the DEP data. The omitted rainfall shock 
category is rainfall amounts less than 0.5 standard deviations above or below the province long-run average rainfall.  The omitted 
land size category is the 5th decile for the ICRISAT data and Size 4 for the DEP data.
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Table 6: Household-Year-Crop Fixed Effects Tobit Estimates of the Determinants of Plot Input Intensities Including the  
Impact of Rainfall Shocks 
 
Dependent Variables: Male Labor Per Hectare Female Labor Per 
Hectare 
Child Labor Per 
Hectare 
Non-Household 
Labor Per Hectare 
Manure (1000kg) per 
Hectare 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Female -631.80*** -669.00*** 116.40*** 152.50*** -248.10** -261.90** -355.70 -400.40 -15.07** -19.87*** 
 [67.42] [67.92] [40.06] [46.74] [102.20] [110.0] [254.90] [255.70] [6.27] [6.84] 
           
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 
Standard Deviations 
BELOW Long-run 
Province Average) 
 134.80* 
[76.85] 
 -239.00*** 
[59.96] 
 27.12 
[65.20] 
 114.70 
[103.50] 
 6.05 
[5.97] 
 
           
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 
Standard Deviations 
ABOVE Long-run 
Province Average) 
 57.41 
[116.00] 
 39.01 
[89.61] 
 104.00 
[111.40] 
 103.80 
[121.30] 
 12.14 
[8.06] 
 
Plot Size           
 1st decile/Size 1 1201.00*** 1195.00*** 1069.00*** 1057.00*** 835.40 837.40 121.10 110.10 23.53** 23.61** 
 [460.2] [446.00] [231.30] [228.00] [534.20] [535.00] [325.80] [309.50] [11.29] [9.97] 
 2nd decile 511.70*** 512.70*** 872.50*** 867.60*** 270.10* 273.50* 397.50 393.50 1.44 1.875 
 [149.1] [142.40] [194.20] [188.00] [149.60] [148.10] [413.10] [411.80] [7.33] [7.54] 
 3rd decile 192.20** 192.60** 641.80*** 646.00*** 188.80** 188.30** 272.30 264.60 -2.52 -2.66 
 [82.21] [81.31] [101.20] [97.68] [90.86] [93.87] [267.80] [287.30] [5.83] [5.96] 
 4th decile/Size 2 69.04 67.65 354.00*** 360.00*** 98.06 98.37 409.30 418.70 -12.77* -12.56* 
 [63.85] [62.39] [70.13] [69.00] [143.10] [143.90] [518.00] [575.80] [7.35] [7.43] 
 6th decile/Size 3 -0.32 3.23 -78.79 -75.95 -58.85 -54.68 -20.29 -20.13 -6.22 -5.78 
 [51.58] [50.44] [48.40] [48.20] [81.05] [84.29] [87.29] [85.45] [9.53] [8.35] 
 7th decile/Size 5 -164.10*** -160.50*** -279.40*** -272.50*** -82.21 -78.89 50.92 56.08 -15.68* -15.53* 
 [58.66] [58.35] [51.27] [51.34] [99.75] [101.50] [90.95] [89.61] [9.02] [9.03] 
 8th decile/Size 6 -372.70*** -366.50*** -358.80*** -354.50*** -290.00* -285.20* -71.39 -66.50 -14.46* -14.02 
 [61.99] [61.15] [59.80] [59.83] [155.10] [159.80] [158.80] [161.90] [7.87] [8.53] 
 9th decile/Size 7 -408.40*** -401.40*** -369.20*** -374.30*** -342.00** -339.40* -290.00 -279.20 -18.33** -18.15** 
 [60.43] [58.72] [65.25] [65.37] [174.20] [178.90] [325.30] [314.30] [7.78] [7.56] 
 10th decile/Size 8 -485.60*** -478.70*** -420.20*** -425.10*** -340.60** -336.90** -233.00 -215.60 -20.53*** -21.17*** 
 [61.96] [60.47] [66.68] [66.80] [153.60] [157.80] [257.90] [244.40] [7.62] [7.55] 
Observations 4655 4655 4655 4655 4655 4655 4655 4655 4655 4655 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. This table is estimated using Honore’s (1992) fixed effects 
Tobit estimator. The estimation was done in Gauss using Honore’s Pantob program using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno optimization method. Similar results 
were obtained using the Polak-Ribiere Conjugate Gradient Method, the Simplex Method, and Powell’s Method. The omitted rainfall shock category is rainfall 
amounts less than 0.5 standard deviations above or below the province long-run average rainfall.  The omitted land size category is the 5th decile.
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Appendix Table 1: Household-Year-Crop Fixed Effects Regressions of the Determinants of Plot Yield 
Including the Impact of Rainfall Shocks (Alternative specification of rainfall shocks) 
ICRISAT Data (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -21.864*** -22.596*** -18.867*** 9.083 
 [5.151] [5.433] [6.974] [29.310] 
     
Female * (Rainfall > 1.5 Standard Deviations 
 BELOW Long-run Province average) 
5.788 
[8.660] 
   
     
Female * (Rainfall > 1 Standard Deviation 
 BELOW Long-run Province average) 
 6.514 
[7.272] 
  
     
Female * (Rainfall < 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 BELOW Long-run Province average) 
  6.218 
[7.031] 
 
     
Female * (Rainfall < 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 ABOVE Long-run Province average) 
  -10.699 
[8.878] 
 
     
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 ABOVE Long-run Province average) 
-31.831* 
[16.961] 
-31.149* 
[17.015] 
-34.887** 
[17.252] 
 
     
Female * Total Rainfall    -0.065 
    [0.051] 
Plot Size:     
 1st decile/Size 1 131.511*** 131.582*** 130.657*** 131.557***
 [41.165] [41.112] [41.179] [41.239] 
 2nd decile 68.409*** 68.477*** 67.380*** 68.838*** 
 [20.448] [20.433] [20.541] [20.522] 
 3rd decile 62.481*** 62.475*** 62.441*** 63.540*** 
 [13.856] [13.838] [13.834] [13.790] 
 4th decile/Size 2 33.195** 33.191** 33.289** 33.737** 
 [13.542] [13.517] [13.510] [13.493] 
 6th decile/Size 3 -3.223 -3.211 -3.217 -2.378 
 [9.014] [9.016] [9.016] [8.903] 
 7th decile/Size 5 -14.742 -14.792 -14.951 -14.286 
 [9.711] [9.712] [9.689] [9.581] 
 8th decile/Size 6 -19.557** -19.629** -19.733** -19.543** 
 [8.888] [8.887] [8.867] [8.701] 
 9th decile/Size 7 -27.336*** -27.451*** -27.789*** -27.648*** 
 [8.588] [8.582] [8.582] [8.532] 
 10th decile/Size 8 -33.996*** -34.091*** -34.105*** -33.259*** 
 [8.829] [8.830] [8.829] [8.670] 
Constant 80.188*** 80.015*** 80.461*** 78.121*** 
 [8.555] [8.546] [8.569] [8.157] 
Observations 4655 4655 4655 4655 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent 
variable is value of plot output/hectare.  In column 1, the omitted rainfall shock category is rainfall amounts between 1.5 
standard deviations (SD) below the province long-run average rainfall and 0.5 SD above long-run average rainfall.  Column 2 
omits the rainfall category between 1 SD below long-run average and 0.5 SD above long-run average.  Column 3 omits the 
rainfall category greater than 0.5 SD below long-run average rainfall.  The omitted land size category is the 5th decile for the 
ICRISAT data. 
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Appendix Table 2: Household-Year-Crop Fixed Effects Regressions of the Determinants of Plot Yield 
Including the Impact of Rainfall Shocks (Alternative specification of rainfall shocks) 
DEP Data     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female 14.990 15.455 -3.580 49.419 
 [14.118] [18.722] [14.880] [71.484] 
     
Female * (Rainfall > 1.5 Standard Deviations 
 BELOW Long-run Province average) 
-17.587 
[73.169] 
   
     
Female * (Rainfall > 1 Standard Deviation 
 BELOW Long-run Province average) 
 -3.317 
[26.802] 
  
     
Female * (Rainfall < 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 BELOW Long-run Province average) 
  45.249 
[29.595] 
 
     
Female * (Rainfall < 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 ABOVE Long-run Province average) 
  38.772 
[92.107] 
 
     
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 ABOVE Long-run Province average) 
-182.969* 
[104.763] 
-183.420* 
[105.495] 
-164.422 
[104.857] 
 
     
Female * Total Rainfall    -0.063 
    [0.121] 
Plot Size:     
 1st decile/Size 1 125.280*** 125.274*** 124.774*** 126.127***
 [21.830] [21.850] [21.809] [21.859] 
 4th decile/Size 2 48.285** 48.364** 48.562** 48.719** 
 [23.269] [23.290] [23.251] [23.321] 
 6th decile/Size 3 17.742 17.835 18.253 17.880 
 [25.187] [25.187] [25.155] [25.201] 
 7th decile/Size 5 -21.400 -21.345 -21.755 -20.720 
 [29.610] [29.608] [29.618] [29.628] 
 8th decile/Size 6 -28.087 -28.002 -28.014 -26.516 
 [30.099] [30.090] [30.054] [30.051] 
 9th decile/Size 7 21.057 20.944 20.458 20.325 
 [27.557] [27.568] [27.572] [27.531] 
 10th decile/Size 8 51.514 51.511 50.385 52.496 
 [39.640] [39.650] [39.676] [39.639] 
Constant 596.463*** 596.304*** 595.737*** 595.980***
 [16.946] [16.927] [16.923] [17.111] 
Observations 11922 11922 11922 11922 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent 
variable is plot output/hectare.  In column 1, the omitted rainfall shock category is rainfall amounts between 1.5 standard 
deviations (SD) below the province long-run average rainfall and 0.5 SD above long-run average rainfall.  Column 2 omits 
the rainfall category between 1 SD below long-run average and 0.5 SD above long-run average.  Column 3 omits the rainfall 
category greater than 0.5 SD below long-run average rainfall.  The omitted land size category is Size 5 for the DEP data. 
 32
Appendix Table 3: Household-Year-Crop Fixed Effects Regressions of the Determinants of Plot Yield 
Broken Down by Crops (Alternative Rainfall Shock Specification) 
 
 ICRISAT Data  DEP Data 
 Millet-
Sorghum 
Cotton- 
Rice-Fonio 
Millet-
Sorghum 
Cotton-
Rice-Fonio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Female -19.076*** -38.603 57.260** -128.627 
 [3.730] [42.897] [24.778] [157.237] 
     
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 BELOW Long-run Province Average) 
5.171 
[5.474] 
73.036 
[47.566] 
-54.571* 
[28.794] 
169.604 
[195.176] 
     
Female * (Rainfall > 0.5 Standard Deviations 
 ABOVE Long-run Province Average) 
-7.879 
[5.637] 
-232.955 
[182.579] 
-190.329* 
[106.304] 
-192.576 
[318.546] 
     
Plot Size:     
 1st decile/Size 1 35.843 226.614** 127.990*** 188.054 
 [38.437] [100.079] [21.275] [127.280] 
 2nd decile 36.728*** 122.011***   
 [11.966] [46.401]   
 3rd decile 29.125*** 117.863***   
 [6.877] [44.150]   
 4th decile/Size 2 17.968*** 58.843 35.713 62.744 
 [5.509] [35.697] [23.752] [130.753] 
 6th decile/Size 3 -2.812 8.787 18.837 49.428 
 [4.471] [41.493] [24.023] [152.326] 
 7th decile/Size 5 -11.710** 20.955 -40.685* 81.504 
 [4.672] [31.384] [24.295] [210.977] 
 8th decile/Size 6 -23.544*** 6.975 2.079 -196.090 
 [5.141] [31.325] [25.429] [224.076] 
 9th decile/Size 7 -27.649*** -5.045 23.935 126.562 
 [4.615] [29.676] [24.108] [199.922] 
 10th decile/Size 8 -32.649*** -12.350 32.365 189.533 
 [4.894] [32.180] [33.646] [278.504] 
     
Constant 56.781*** 68.416 521.316*** 828.957***
 [3.999] [46.646] [15.706] [105.577] 
     
Observations 2195 994 7015 1543 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The 
dependent variable is value of plot output/hectare for the ICRISAT data and plot output/hectare for the DEP data.  
The omitted land size category is the 5th decile for the ICRISAT data and Size 4 for the DEP data. 
